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WOOD v. DETROIT CITY RAILWAY CO.
Where a party drives his vehicle upon a street car track, without looking to see
whether a car is coming, and then refuses to get out of the way, though there is
ample opportunity to do so, he is guilty of such negligence as to prevent his recovery
in an action on the case for thc negligence of the driver.
If the action were trespass, it might become necessary to decide whether or not
the injury was purposely inflicted ; but if it was, the car company would not be
liable for the wilful trespass of the driver.
ERROR

to Wayne.

John G. Hfawley, for plaintiff and appellant.
J'ohn C. Donnelly, for defendant.
COOLEY, C.. J.-This is an action for personal injuries alleged to

have been caused by the driver of the defendant negligently causing
his car to run against the vehicle of the plaintiff as he was driving
along one of the streets of Detroit. The plaintiff was sworn as a
witness in his own behalf, and he also called the driver as his witness. After hearing both stories, the Circuit Judge ruled that
there was nothing to go to the jury, and directed a verdict for the
defendant. The plaintiff brings error.
According to the plaintiff's story he was driving a one-horse
vehicle along the street on one side of the defendant's track, when
he encountered obstructions and turned towards the tracks, so that
his right-hand wheels were over the rails. He did not look
behind him to see if a car was coming until he felt something strike
the rear wheel. He then looked around and saw it was the street
car, and the driver, as he says, "motioned me with one hand to
go on, or he would knock a wheel off me. I laughed at hiim and
said, ' You bad better not knock off more than one or two of them,
or somebody will have to pay for them.' He kept on motioning to
get out of the way. I told him I could not get over those wagons,
and I was not going to try, but I would get out of his way just as
soon as ever I could. I kept on. There was a number of wagons
standing on the other side of the street, loaded with brick, and
three, or four, or five of them with the rear ends of the wagons out
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on the street further than the fore end, which brought the rear
end of these wagons very near the car track, so that I had to get
with the wheels on the right-band side of my wagon partially
on to the track, and some places it got off the track, and some
places I had to get right out pretty well over the track.", Up to
this point the plaintiff was not only in fault, but he was the only
party in fault. He had driven upon the track in front of an
approaching car, without looking around until the car had come,
into collision with his vehicle. This was gross carelessness on his
part. But further on his evidence shows that the other side of the
track was entirely unobstructed, and that there was nothing to
prevent his crossing at once and allowing the street car to proceed
on its way. The car had come to a standstill on the first collision,
and the plaintiff's conduct in maintaining his ground,- and responding to the driver's request that he should get out of the way
by a laugh and a threat, was not only a wrong to the defendant,
but also to any persons who might then be riding in the car or
awaiting its coming.
But the plaintiff further testified that as he was leaving the
track the driver called out, " God damn you, I can smash you
anyhow," and that he let go the brake and the car almost instantly
struck the plaintiff's wagon-and threw it over, inflicting the injury
complained of. The inference from this might be that the driver
purposely, and in the anger excited by their altercation, ran-his car
against the plaintiff's wagon ; and, if the action had been brought
for the trespass, it might become necessary to decide whether,
under cases like Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 848, the defendant
would be responsible. In that case it was decided that where the
servant wilfully drove his master's conveyance over a third person
and injured him, the trespass was that of the servant, for which
the master was not liable. The case was followed in Richmond,
fc., Turnpike Co. v. Vanderbilt, 1 Hill 480; s. c. in error, 2 N.
Y. 479, where the master of a vessel had purposely run the vessel
into. another; and in Illinois Cent. Railroad Co. v. Downey, 18
Ill. 259, where the engineer upon a railroad purposely ran his
engine over live stock. Also, in .DeCamp v. Railroad Co., 12
Iowa 848, and m ny other cases.
The general principle, that the master is not liable for his
servant's trespasses, is familiar, and was recognised by this court
in Chicago, &c., Railroad Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205. And if
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it were important to determine whether the injury was one purposely inflicted,, and not one resulting from carelessness, the
question would no doubt be one to be submitted to the jury:
Rounds v. Delaware, &c., Railroad Co., 64 N. Y. 129. But
this is an action in case, and the ground on which it is sought to
charge the defendant is, that its servant negligently drove the car
against the plaintiff's vehicle. We are then to see whether, if
negligence on the part of the driver is made out, or there is any
evidence tending to prove it, the plaintiff himself, on his evidence,
does not appear to have been at least equally negligent. And we
think he does. He knew very well he was in the driver's way,
and he had ample time and opportunity to get out of danger if so
disposed. That he was not disposed to allow the car to go on
until it suited his pleasure to do so, is quite apparent; and there
is abundant reason in his evidence for believing that he -was purposely annoying the driver and delaying the car. If so he cannot
complain of the consequences.
The driver's testimony is quite different from the plaintiff's.
He testified that when he first signalled the plaintiff to get off the
track, the plaintiff made no effort to do so. The driver told him
to get off or he would be run into, and he replied, run, and be
damned; he had as much right to the track as the driver had, and
would get off when he pleased. He drove right along on the track,
looking back and scolding the driver. Finally he turned off and the
,car moved on, but he almost immediately turned again towards the
track sufficiently to be struck by the car. If this evidence is true
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was plain and very
gross, and he must bear the consequences. Whether, therefore,
we believe the plaintiff or the driver, the ruling of the circuit
judge was well warranted.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
The other justices concurred.
There can be no doubt as t the correctness of the decision in the principal case. As respects the liability
of the principal for the wilful trespass
of the agent, referred to by the court in
the principal case, there may, however,
well exist some difference of opinion.
The rule is generally stated to be, that
a master is not answerable for the wilful

and malicious act of his servant. It
was so held in the leading cases of McMants v. Crickett, 1 East 106, and
Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343, and
these cases have been followed in many
subsequent cases: Richnond 'Turnpike
Co. v. Vanderbilt, 1 aill 480; s. c. 2
N. Y. 482; Isaacs v. Third Ave. Railroad Co., 47 Id. 122; .Rpsher v.
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Wattson, 17 Penn. St. 369; Harris v.
Nicholas, 5 Munf. 483; Brown v. P.rviance, 2 Har. & G. 316; Wallace v.
hinberg, 46 Tex. 37; Bl1. Cent. Railroad Co. v. Downey, 18 Ill. 259; De
Camp v. Miss., d-c., Railroad Co., 12
Iowa 348. See, also, Evans on Agency
*480; Story on Agency, sect. 456, and
the cases there cited.
Mc fanus v. Crickett was an action
of trespass, in which it appeared that
the servant of the defendant. wilfully
drove his master's carriage against the
carriage of the plaintiff, the defendant
not being present nor in any manner
directing or assenting to the act of the
servant.
I In Wrilz v. Wilcox the action was
in
case against both master and servant for
the wilful act of the servant in driving
over a boy with his master's wagon
while in his master's employment. In
both cases it was held that the master,
was not liable.
The doctrine of these cases has, however, been more than once controverted.
Judge Thtnm, in his work on Domestic
Relations 358-360, and Judge REDFiEL, in his work on Railways (vol.
1, sect. 130, note), attack the pfinciple
of these cases with their accustomed,
vigor and ability. Judge REDFInEW
contends that the principle that a master
is not liable for the wilful wrong of his
servant, is not applicable to the case of
corporations, and, especially, such as
railways: Redf. on Railroads, sect.
130, citing Edwards v. The Union
Bank, I Fla. 136; Whiteman v. Wimington, 4-c., Railway, 2 Harr. 514.
(See, also, Cooley on Torts 534 ; New
Orleans, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Albritton,
38 Miss. 277; Carker v. C. 4- N. W.
Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657, where a
railway company was held liable to pay
the sum of $1000 'damages for the conductor's kissing a female passenger
against her will.) In a note to the same
section, too long to be quoted in its
entirety, he says: It has always seemed

to us that the whole class of cases which
hold that the master is not liable for the
wilful acts of his servant, has grown up
under a misinterpretation of the case of
M1'cManus v. Ctickett, I East 106, for
they all profess to base themselves upon
that case. That case, we apprehend,
was never intended to decide more than
that the master is not liable in trespass
for the wilful act of the servant. Lord
Ksasro, C. J., in delivering his opinion in that case, with which the court
concur, expressly says, speaking of
actions on the case, brought against the
master, where the servant negligently
did a wrong in the course of his employment for the master: "The form
of these actions shows that where the
servant is in point of law a trespasser,
the master is not liable as such, though
liable to make compensation for the
damage consequential from his employing of an unskilful or negligent servant.
The act of the master is the employment of the servant. This reasoning
certainly applies with the same force to
that class of cases where the act of the
servant is both direct and wilful, as
where it is only negligent. The master
is not liable in either case, perhaps, so
much for having impliedly authorized
the act, as for having employed an unfaithful servant, who did the injury'in
the course of his employment. And
whether done negligently or wilfifly,
seems to be of no possible moment, as to
the liability of the master, the only inquiry being whether it was done in the
course of the servant's employment.
And the argument that, where the servant acts wilfully, he ipso facto leaves
the employment of the master, and, if
be is driving a coach-and-six or a lc4-motive
and train of cars, thereby acquires a special property in the things,
and is pro hatc vice the owner and doing
his own business, may sound plausible
enough, perhaps, but we confess it seems
to us unsound, although gathered from
so ancient a date as Rolle's Abridgment,
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and adopted by so distinguished a judge man may purposely defraud another in
as Lord KENyoN. The truth is the selling his master's goods, that he may
whole argument is only a specious fal- gratify his private malice against the
lacy; and whether Lord KEwTox in- purchaser; but if the master had emtended really to say that no action will powered him to make the sale, he must
lie against the master in such case, or take the responsibility of any wrong
only to say, what the case required, that committed in making it. The test of
the master is not liable in trespass, it is the master's responsibility is not the
very obvious the proper distinction in motive of the servant, but whether that
regard to the master's liability, cannot which he did was something his employer contemplated, and something
be made to depend upon the question of
the intention of the servant. The master which, if he should do it lawfully, he
has nothing to do either way with the might do in his master's name." See
purpose and intention of his servants. the cases collected and considered in
It is with their acts that he is to be the notes of the learned author above
affected ; and, if these come within the quoted.
In Howe v. N ewmarch, 12 Allen 49,
range of tieir employment, the master
is liable, whether the act be a misfea- the case of McManus v. Crickett is
sance or a non-feasance, an omission or criticised, and the rule laid down by
commission, carelessly or purposely Hox, J., that if the servant, wholly
done." See the note above quoted for a purpose of his own, disregarding
from and the cases there cited, for a the object for which he is employed, and
not intending by his act to execute it,
further discussion of this question.
With reference to the general sub- does an injury to another not within the
ject, Judge COOLEr, in his work on scope of his employment, the master is
Torts 535-6, makes the following obser- not liable. But if the act be done in
vations: "The liability of the master the execution of the authority given him
for" intentional acts which constitute by the master, and for the purpose of
legal wrongs, can only arise when that performing what the master has directed,
which is done is within the real or ap- the master will be responsible, whether
parent scope of the master's business. the wrong done be occasioned by negliIt does not follow where the servant has gence, or by a wanton or reckless purstepped aside from his employment to pose to accomplish the master's business
create a tort which the master has neither in an unlawful manner."
In Mot v. Consumers' I7ce 'Co., 73
directed in fact, nor could be supposed,
from the nature of his employment, to N. Y. 543, the rule is laid down as folhave authorized or expected the servant lows, ALLEN, J., delivering the opinion
to do. * * * In determining whether of the court: "For the acts of the seror not the master shall be held respon- vant within the general scope of his emsible, the motive of the servant in com- ployment, while engaged in his master's
mitting the act is important, for if he business, and done with a view to the
furtherance of that business and the
supposes he is acting in furtherance of
the master's interest, under a discre- master's interest, the master will be
tionary authority which the master has responsible, whether the act be done
conferred upon him, the case wuL gen- negligently, wantonly or even "wilfully.
erally have an aspect quite different In general terms, if the servant misfrom what it would present if it was conducts himself in the course of his emmanifest that malice were being indulged ployment, his acts are the acts of the
irrespective of the master's interest. master, who must answer for them.
But the motive is not conclusive. A ** * But if a servant goes outside of
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his employment, and without regard to Third Ave. Railroad Co., 47 N. Y.
his services, acting maliciously, or in 122; Miggins v. Watervliet Turnpie,
-c., Co., 46 N. Y. 23 ; Goddard v.
order to effect some purpose of his own,
wantonly commits a trespass, or causes Gd. Trunk Railway Co., 57 Me. 202.
In Underhill on Torts (Moak's ed.),
damage to another, the master is not
responsible; so that the inquiry is cht. iii., sub-rule 2, p. 35, the rule is
whether the wrongful act is in the thus stated: "A master is responsible
course of the employment, or outside for the manner in which his servant does
of it, and to accomplish a purpose for- an act for the master's benefit, which act
eign to it. In the latter case the rela- is within the scope of his probable aution of master and servant does not thority, even though such manner was
exist so as to hold the master for the contrary to the master's orders ; but a
act."
See, also, Rounds v. Del., Lack. master is not responsible for an act of
his servant which is in itself, and not
West. Railroad Co., 64 N. Y. 129.
In a note to sect. 456, of Story on merely in the manner of doing it, illeAgency, already referred to, the editor
gavL"
Authorities upon the question under
says: "If the act of the servant was
wilful and intentional, still if it was done consideration might be multiplied, but
with the intention of furthering the the foregoing citations will enable the
reader to understand the drift of modem
object of his employment, and was not
a manifest departure from the general authority upon this important question,
line of his duty, then, according to the from which, we think, it must be apweight of authority, the master will be parent that, if the court, in McManus
V. Cik,
intended to decide that a
liable.
In either case supposed, .it
would be no defence to prove that the master is not liable in any form of action
for any wilful or malicious act of his
master had expressly forbidden the act"
Citing Limpus v. London, 4-c., Onmibus servant, this rule has, according to the
Co., I H. & C. 526; Howe v. New- weight of authority, been considerably
march, 12 Allen 49 ; Betts v. De 1Yitre, modified and placed upon a more satisfactory and reasonable basis. Whether
L. R., 3 Ch. App. 441 ; Whatman v.
Pearson, L. R., 3 C. P. 422 ; Philadel- the liability of the master according to
the authorities above cited is yet cophia, 6-c., Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14
extensive with the demands of justice in
How. 468-; Garretzen v. Duewkel, 50
eases, may perhaps be open to question,
Mo. 104; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass.
180; Passenger, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. but th6 more modern rule upon the subject is certainly a great advance upon
Young, 21 Ohio St. 518; Sb erley v.
Billings, 8 Bush (Ky.) 147 ; Bayley V. that laid down in some of the older
cases. ,
Manchester, 4-c., Railway Co., L. R., 7
MLD. EwiEg.
C. P. 415 ; The Thetis, L. R., 2 Adm.
Chigago.
& E. 365; Ramsden v. Boston, &.,
Railroad Co., 104 Mass. 117 ;
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Supreme Court of Ohio.
ARROWSMITH v. HORMENING.
In the absence of proof an act of the legislature is presund to take effect from
the first moment of the day on which it is passed.
The rule that the law never regards the fraction of a day will not be applied
wlmre its application would defeat a vested right, or otherwise work injustice ; hut
where an act has an exception in favor of pending actions, it is incumbent on a party
who wishes'to bring an action, commenced on the same day, within the exception,
to show, by proof, the exact time of day at which the act was passed.

MOTION to dismiss petition in error. The following were the
fActs :
On April 18th 1883, an act was passed (80 Ohio L. 169),
amending sect. 6710, Revised Statutes, which allowed petitions in
error to be filed in the Supreme Court without leave, so as to
require leave to be first granted. It repealed the original seotion,
and enacted that the amended section "shall take effect, and be in
force, from and after t8 passage, and apply to all cases and proceedings hereafter brought in or into the Supreme Court."
On the same day, but whether before or after the act was passed
does not appear, a petition in error was filed in this case without
leave of this court.
Newbegin

4 Kingsbury, Latty 4 Peaslee, for the motion.

Harris 4' Cameron, Cox

'

Cochran, contra.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOHNSON, 0. J. -This motion is not well taken if the petition
in error was a pending action or proceeding when the act of April
18th 1883 took effect; because sect. 79 of the Revised Statutes
provides that the amendment or repeal of a statute "shall in no
manner affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, civil or
criminal, and when the repeal or amendment relates to the remedy,
it shall not affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings,
unless so expressed."
The provisions of sect. 6710, as amended, relate to the remedy
in a civil action. They do not affect pending actions or proceedings, but in express terms the act applies "to all cases and proVOL. XXXII.-32
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ceedings hereafter brought in or into the Supreme Court." In
behalf of the motion to dismiss two grounds are relied on.
1. That the act of April 18th, which took away the right to file
a petition in error without leave, took effect from and after the
first moment of the day of it8 pa8age, though, in fact, not signed
by the presiding officers until some time towards 'the close of the
day, and therefore it was in force during all of that day, and no
petition in error could on that day be filed without leave.
2. If this is not so, then the journals of the two houses of the
legislature show the act was, in fact and in law, passed on the
17tb, though not enrolled and signed until the next day, and,
therefore, an action commenced on the 18th was after the act
passed and took effect.
Assuming, without deciding, that the repealing statute did not
take effect until the 18th, the point to be determined remains, was
the petition in error filed after it took effect, or before ? If before
it took effect, theh, by sect. 79 of the Revised Statutes, it was -g
pending case under original section 6710, and the repeal did not
affect it; but if after, then leave must be obtained, and the motioli
is well taken.
This act was passed and took effect from and after its passage.
On the same day the petition in error was filed. Which was first
in point of time on that day we are not advised by proof As
there is no law requiring, that the exact time in the day shall be
noted of the passage of an act, or the commencement of an action,
there is no record evidence of the fact, but resort may be had to
other proper proof.
If we are advised of this fact, it would doubtless be proper to
disregard the maxim that the law knows no fracfions of a day, and
to determine, as a fact, the exact time during the 18th day of
April the petition was filed and the act ,passed, and if the former
was the first in time, to hold that the repealing statute, in view of
the provisions of sect. 79, did not affect it, though it relates to the
remedy, merely. This would seem to follow from the terms of
article 11, sect. 28, of the constitution, which provides that the
general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws; and
from the provisions of sect. 79 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that a repeal or amendment of an existing statute, even as to
the remedy, shall not affect a pending action, unless it is expressly
so provided in the repealing statute.

ARROWSMITH v. HORMENING.

These provisions would seem to apply as well to parts of a day
as to whole days. -A law passed in the latter part of a day, if it
affected transactions of the earlier part of the day, Would be retroactive in its operation as fully as if they took place the day before.
So I think if this petition in error was filed on the same day, but
before the repealing statute was passed and took effect, it would be
a pending case within the meaning of sect. 79. The rule that the
law never regards the fractions of a day is only observed for the
purposes of justice; but when its application would defeat a vested
right, or otherwise work injuriously, it will not be applied.
Thus, in Seaman v. BEager, 16 Ohio St. 209, it was held that
the exact moment in a day might be resorted to, to determine the
rights of parties under the acts relating to the filing and refiling
of a chattel mortgage, and that time is to be counted from the
moment of such filing, and not from the day. The same rule was
applied in .Follett v. Hall, 16 Ohio 111, where a mortgage was
filed on the first day of a term of court, but before the court convened. So where an attachment was sued out at seven o'clock P.
m., of March 8th, and a petition in bankruptcy was filed at two
o'clock and fifty minutes in the afternoon of the 8th of July, it
was held, that as the bankrupt act dissolved all attachments sued
out within four months before the commencement of proceedings
in bankruptcy, and as the actual time was less than four months,
by four hours and ten minutes, the attachment must fail : Westbrook Manufacturing Co. v. Grant, 60 Me. 88.
The same rule has been applied when it becomes important to
ascertain the order in which two or more statutes, bearing the same
date, are passed: Bishop on Written Laws, sect. 29. To the same
effect are National Bank v. Burkhart, 100 U. S. 686; and Lang
v. Phillips, 27, Ala. 311. So where there are two statutes containing repugnant provisions, the one last signed by the governor
is a repeal of the one previously signed: Southwark Bank v. The
Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St. 446.
And in The People ex rel. v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406, it was held
that a statute which was to take effect from and after its passage,.
takes effect from the moment it is approved by the governor, and
for the purpose of determining the right of a person to an office,
it is competent to inquire at what particular point of time in the
day it took effect.
See also Gardnerv. The Collector, 8 Wall. 499, where it is said
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to be settled on principle, as well as authority, that whenever a
question arises in a court of law as to the time when a statute takes
effect, appropriate proof may be resorted to, to determine when the
act took effect, that is, the exact time in the day.
No such proof was offered in the case at bar. If the plaintiff in
error relies on the fact that his action was pending on the 18th,
before the actual time of the passage of the statute in question, he
must, in order to defeat the presumption that it went into effect the
first moment of that day, show that his petition was first filed.
This he has not done, and we are left to the presumption that arises
from the date of the act,
As section 6710 relates to the remedy merely, we are not embarrassed by any question of vested rights, or by the provision of the
constitution, art. 11, sect. 28,. relating to retroactive laws. His
right, if he has one, arose under original section 6710, and is saved
by section 79, which saves pending actions in case of a repeal of a
statute relating to the remedy. This statute took effect "from and
after its passage," and not from and after a day named in the act.
The day it was enacted is to be included.
When the computation is to be made from an act done, the day
on which it was done is included.
In: this respect it differs from a statute repealing a former statute
on the same subject, which is to take effect from and after a day
named therein. In that case it does not take effect until the expiration of the day named: Koltenbrock v. Cracrqft, 36 Ohio St. 584.
By its terms the act took effect on the 18th and not on the
19th of April, and the presumption arises in the absence of any
proof of the exact time of the day on which it was passed, that
it took effect from the first moment of that day. Formerly; in
England, the rolls of Parliament were strung together as one act,
the only date being that of the assembling of Parliament. In that
case the presumption was that the act took effect from the first day
of the session, the record being the sole guide: Latters v. .Patten,
4 D. & E. 660.
The act of 83 Geo. 3, c. 13, provides that after 1793 the day of
the royal assent to an act was required to be endorsed on the act,
and the date of that indorsement fixed the day the act should take
effect, and by construction- the act took effect from the first moment
of that day: Tomlinson v. Bullock, 4 Q. B. D. 230. The rule
thus stated governs, except when some provision of law is violated,
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or where adherence to it would work injustice. When this would
result, the fiction that the law knows no fraction of a day would yield
to proof of the exact time in the day an act was passed.
But as no case is made by the plaintiff in error to enforce this
principle, we are left to the ordinary presumption that the act of
April 18th took effect from the commencement of that day,
and therefore there was no "pending case" when it took effect:
Bishop on Vritten Law, chap. 4, and notes; Arnold v. TIhe
United tatev 9 Cranch 104; In re -Wyman, Chase's Decisions
227; Vational Bank v. Burkhart, 100 U. S. 686; ITn Matter of

Joeph Richardion,2 Story 571.
Motion sustained.
The principal case contains a very
clear statement of the reason why the
early English statute took effect from
the first day of the session of Parliament. In an old authority it is said
that "every statute begins to have
effect, unless a time is therein mentioned, from the first day of that session
of Parliament in which it is made :"
Bacon's .Abr. 636, Let. C. ; 4 Inst. 25 ;
Brook's Abr., pl. 8, 6; Plowd. Com.
796; Puanter v. Attorney-General, 6
Bro. Par. Cas. 486 ; Renley v. Jones, I
Sidf. 310; Rex v. Call, Comb. 413;
. c. 1 Ld. Raym. 370; Rob. Ill;
Cro. Car. 424. Even where the act declared that it should take effect I'from
and after the passing of the act," it
was held to operate by legal fiction from
the first day of the session : Ldtless v.
Holmes, 4 T. R. 660. See opinion of
the judges, 3 Gray 601. In 1797 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey declared
this rule was in force in that state, even
in criminal cases; and the court referred to a case that had been before it,
where the offence was highly penal, and
considerable anxiety had been felt
whether the court was authorized to
adopt another rule; a verdict of acquittal obviated the necessity of a decision: Austin v. Nelson, 1 Halst. 381.'
The English rule was followed in North
Carolina, until 1799, when it was

changed by statute: Smith v. Smith,
Mart. 26; Weeks v. Weeks, 5 Ire. Eq.
111 ; Hamlet v. Taylor, 5 Jones L. 36 ;
Sumner v. Barksdale, Const. Rep. 111 ;
State v. The Banks, 12 Rich. L. 609.
Sometimes this rule operated very
harshly. In Rex v. Thurston, I Lev.
91, by this relation an act was rendered
a murder, which was not so when the
deed was committed.
As stated in the principal case, the
rule has been changed by statute. And
although it be expressly declared in the
statute that it shall take effect from a
day named therein, yet, if the royal assent be not given until after the day
mentioned, it will not take effect until
signed by his majesty, and will have no
retroactive effect: Burn v. Carvolho, 4
N. & M. 893. But where an act was
passed to correct an error in a statute
previously passed at the same session,
it was held to relate back to the time
when the first act had been passed:
Attorney-General v. Pougett, 2 Price
381. See 1 Kent's Com. 495.
In an early case the Supreme Court of
the United States decided that a statute
passed Mlarch 3d 1803, was in force on
that day; and declared the general rule
to be that a statute is operative from its
date, if its operation is not postponed
by some law: Mathews v. Zane, 7
Wheat. 164; The Brig Ann, I Gall.
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62 ; Johnson v. Merchandise, 2 Paine
601; Goodsell v. Boynton, 1 Scam.
(111.).555; Branch Bank of Mobile v.
Murphy, 8 Ala. 119; Heard v. Heard,
8 Geo. 380; Temple v. Hays, 1.Morr.
(Ia.) 9; Dyer v. State, 1 Meigs
(Tenn.) 237; Smets v. Weathersbee,
R. M. Charlton (Geo.) 537; Rathbone
v. Bradford, I Ala. 312; State v.
Click, 2 Id. 26; Parkinson v. State, 14
Md. 184; Taylor v. State, 31 Ala.
383; State v. Banks, 12 Rich. (S. C.)
L. 609; Caprnan v. State, 2 Head
(Tenn.) 36. It is presumed that the
statute is in force from the earliest moment
of the day of its passage, if it goes in
effect on, that day: Salmon v. Burgess,
1 Hughes C. C. 356 ; West v. Creditors,
I La. Ann. 365 ; Mallory v. Hiles, 4
Met. (Ky.) 53: Bassett v. United
States, 2 Ct. of Claims 448;. Tarlton
v. Peggs, 18 Ind. 24. See Fairchild
v. Gwynne, 14 Abb. Pr. 121 ; Rice v.
Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125; Price v.
Hopkin, 13 Id. 318; Re Carrier, 13
Bankpt. Reg. 208 ; The Schooner Lynchburg, Blatch. Prize Cas. 3; In re Ankrim, 3 McLean 285.
The only case that holds a different
rule is King v. Moore, Jefferson's Rep.
(Va.) 9, where the words of an act
were "from and after the passing of
this act;" the day of passing the act
was held to be excluded. See, however,
State ex rd. Fodick v. Perrysburg, 14
Ohio St. 472; also Matter of Richardson, 2 Story 571 ; Laughlin v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush (Ky.) 261 ; Gamble v.
Beattie, 4 How. Pr. 40.
In Tennessee it is -aid a statute is
"passed" when signed by the governor,
or carried over his veto : Logan v. State,
3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 442; and, although,
by its terms, it is to take effect from its
passage, it does not go into force until it
is signed by the governor : Bill v. &ate,
5 Lea (Tenn.) 725; see Clarke v. City
of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446; Wartman
v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 202 ; United
States ex rel. Jones v. Fanning, Mor.

(Ia.) 348. Wheretwostatuteswentinto
effect the same day, it was said that
there was no doubt that they took effect
the same instant: Griswold v. Atlantic
Dock Co., 21 Barb. 225.
An act laying duties on goods imported, "from and after the passage of
the act," takes eirect the beginning of
the day on which it is passed, and not
from the time of its being signed by the
president. And it was said by the court:
"From the impracticability of deciding
at what particular moment of time the
president gives his seal to a bill, we
have never heard of such inquiry
beixg made, and the least which courts
have ever said on such occasions is,
that where an act is to take place from
the day of its passage, as is the case
here, it must embrace the whole of that
day. Here, emphatically, no fractions
of a day should be allowed; otherwise
the commencement of a law, would in
such cases, not be a matter of record and
uniform, but depend on evidence as to
the time of signature, and would vary
in different courts according to the testimony which might be offered as to that
fact:" United States v. Williams, 1
Paine C. C. 261. This case did not
admit parol evidence to prove the exact
time of the approval by the executive.
Other cases follow this ruling: In re
Welman, 20 Vt. 653; In re Howes, 21
Id. 619. But it will hereafter appear
that the case in Paine's Reports has been
overruled by the Supreme Court.
All treaties take effect from the time
they are signed by the plenipotentiaries
who sign them, unless they otherwise
provide; and this ratification relates
back to such time : Davis v. Conwordia,
9 How. 280; United States v. Reqnr,
Id, 127; Vattel, B. 4, c. 2, sect. 22.
A resolution passed by Congress takes
effect from the beginning of the dayof its approval : Smith v. Draper, 5
Blatchf. 238.
F LACToIu oF A DAY.-While the
general rule undoubtedly is that statutes
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will be deemed to have taken effect at
the first moment of the day they go into
force, yet there are cases where such a
rule will not be enforced. If the statute
is to take effect a certain number of
days after its passage-say twenty daysthe general rule will undoubtedly prevail. But where it takes effect "from
and after" or "on" the day of its passage, the exact time or moment its
passage is finished may undoubtedly be
shown.
In Alabama the rule was stated as
follows: "Upon authority and principles of policy and convenience * * *
we decide that a public statute, remedial
in its character, and not prescribing
punishment or penalties, is of force
during the entire day of its approval,
and that the law in reference thereto
does not recognise auy fraction of a day.
Yet we concede that the decisions are
Wood v.
not entirely harmonious:"
Fort, 42 Ala. 641 ; citing Eliza v.
State, 39 Id. 693; Mobile and Ohio
Railroad Co. v. State, Id. 573 ; Toseph
Biclhardson, 6 Law Rep. 392 ; David v.
HUowes, Id. 297; In re Welman, 20 Vt.
653; Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch
104.
But this general rule was not followed
in Massachusetts in a case before the
Supreme Court of that state. There an
action had been commenced before a
justice of the peace on the day of the
passage of a statute which vested the
exclusive jurisdiction of all such actions,
not already pending, in a police court,
and took effect "from and after its
passage." It was held that the action
could not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, without proof that it was commenced at a later hour than the approval
of the act by the governor. The court
said: "It being conceded that the
justice had jurisdiction until the precise
point when the act was approved by the
governor, the justice had jurisdiction
during a portion at least of the 7th of
May. His jurisdiction previously ac-

quired was in full force in the early part
of that day, and, for aught that appears,
for many hours of that day. To sustain this motion to dismiss, it must be
made apparent that this writ was issued
after the passage of this act. Showing
merely that it was issued on the 7th
of May fails to establish that fact,
and there is nothing else in the case to
show it:" Kennedy v. Palmer, 6 Gray
316.
The principal case declares the rule to
be-as a rule of constructionnot as a rule
of presumption-that in the absence of
evidence it will be held that an act of
the legislature took effect from the earliest moment of the day of its passage.
In such an instance the court will not
take judicial notice of the exact time of
the approval of the act, because of the
impracticability of its ascertainment.
To overcome the rule of construction,
evidence must be introduced to enlighten the court.
In 1861 President Lincoln approved
an act of Congress without designating
the year of approval. Parol evidence
was admitted to prove the year in which
it had been approved. The reasoning
of the ceurt led to the following points:
1. It being the duty of the judge to
take judicial notice of the contents of a
public statute, which need not be proven
before them as facts, they must take also
judicial notice of the date of their enactment.
2. In ascertaining, therefore, the date,
the judge should look at whatever appears to be adapted to inform their own
minds. The date attached to the president's signature, if ful, will ordinarily
be sufficient.
If it is not full resort may be had to
the journal, the time of publication of
the statute, and other sources, to fill the
blank. If the ends of justice require the
precise moment to be ascertained, this
may be done if in any way the minds of
the judges can be reasonably satisfied.
It may even be shown that the date
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which the president attached to his signature is an error. "We are of opinion, on principle as well as authority,
that, whenever a question arises in a court
of law, as to the existence of a statute,
or of the time when a statute took effect,
or of the precise terms of a statute, the
judges who are called upon to decide it
have a right to resort to any source of
information which, in its nature, is capable of conveying to the judicial mind
a clear and satisfactory answer to such
question; always seeking first for that
which, in its nature, is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted
a different rule :" Gardnerv. The Collector, 6 Wall. 499.
In Illinois parol evidence was admitted to show that an actual signing
of the bill, as approved, was done by
mistake: People v. Hatch, 19 Ill. 283.
See Speer v. Plank Road Co., 10 Harris 378.
The case in Wallace's Reports was
followed in Matter of Wynne, Char.
Dec., p. 251.
Where duties on goods had been paid,
and they were so stamped and removed,
and on the same day the president approved a bill increasing the duties on such
gobds, it was held that such increase of
'duties could not be enforced Lon such
goods. In this case it was agreed that
the duties had been paid and the goods
removed frem the storehouse, before the
approval of the act. It was said,: "In
the present case the president approved
the bill, and the time of such approval
points out the earliest possible moment
at which it could become a law; or, in
the words of the Act of March 3d 1875,
at which it took effect :" Burgess v.
Salmon, 97 U. S. 381; dintinguishing
Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191 ;
where the inquiry was, whether a proclamation issued by President Johnson,
bearing date June 24th 1865, but published and promulgated June 27th of
the same year, took effect on the first

date on the latter-it was held that it
took effect June 24th 1865.
In the case of the United States v.
Norton, 97 U. S. 164, the court decided
that the President's Proclamation of
June 18th 1865, took effect as of the
beginning of that day, and covered all
the transactions of that day to which it
was applicable. But it was added:
"We do not think this is a case in
which fractions of a day should be tjken
This construction was
into account."
adopted to avoid the enforcement of a
forfeiture. The construction adopted in
Gardener v. The Collector, supra, wa
also adopted to avoid a forfeiture.
Mr. Justice SToar had occasion to
discuss the question under consideration
with considerable fulness. By an act
approved March 8d 1843, the statpts
establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout Le United States,
approved August 19th 1841, was repealed. But it contained a proviso that
thp act should not affect any cause or
proceeding in -bankruptcy commenced be.
fore it* passage, or any pains, penalties
or forfeitures incurred under said act ;
but that "every such proceeding might
be continued to its final consummation,"
in like manner as if that act had not
passed. A petition in bankruptcy was
filed by Richardson on the 3d of March
1848, and the question arose whether
it was cut off by the repealing act
approved on the same day. It appeared
that the petition was filed about noon,
while the repealing act was not, in fact,
approved by the president until late
in the same day, several hours after the
filing of the petition. It was ruled,
upon the case presented, that the Act of
Congress should be held to have taken
effect only from the act of approval by
the president, and not by relation from
the commencement of the day on which
such approval was given. The court
said: "So that we see that there is no
ground'of authority, and certainly,
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there is no reason to assert, that any
such general rule prevails, as that the
law does not allw offractions of a day.
On the contrary, common sense and
common justice equally sustain the propriety of allowing fractions of a day,
whenever it will promote the purpose of
substantial justice :" In Matter of Richardson, 2 Story 571.
In People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406, Clark
was elected county judge at an election
regularly appointed and held. On that
day the legislature passed an act repealing the one by virtue'of which the election was held, and conferring upon the
governor the power pf appointment.
The repealing act was approved the
same day, but at what hour of thd day
it did not appear. Several days thereafter the relator was appointed by the.
governor county judge. The court up.
held the validity olf the election, saying
that "the time of the approval of the
executive is a fact which can be ascertained and proven, and in all cases,
where the rights of parties are in any
manner to be affected by the time of the
approval, an investigation of the question, when the event--the passage of
the act--occurred should be had:"
People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406 ; Craig v..
Godfroy, Id. 415.
The case just cited was relied upon as
an authority to the proposition that parol
evidence was admissible to prove that a
bill had been approved by the governor
at a time when he was not authorized to
approve it: Fowler v. Winslow, 2 Cal.
165 ; overruled in Sherman v. Story, 30
Cal. 253, because the approved bill
imports absolute verity.
The case of Loui ville v. Savings
Bank, 104 U. S. 469, presents a question somewhat analogous to People v.
Clark, supra. The people of the state
of Illinois adopted, July 2d 1870, an
amendment to the state constitution prohibiting subscriptions by towns, cities,
&c., to aid in the building of railroads.
On the same day the township voted to
Vo. XXXII.-33

issue aid-bonds, by a vote of only fiftytwo votes for and two against the proposition. Upon these facts the Supreme
Court of the United States held the
bonds valid; holding that the polls
opened for the adoption of the constitutional amendment having closed at
six o'clock in the evening of that day,
the amendment was not adopted until
that hour, and the court would presume
that all of the fifty-two votes for issuing
the bonds had been cast and counted
before that hour. The case is a very
instructive one.
In National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100
U. S. 686, it was said: "For most
purposes the law regards the entire day
as an indivisible unit. But when the
priority of one legal right over another,
depending upon the order of events
occurring on the same day is involved,
this rule is necessarily departed from."
See Westbrook Manaf. Co. v. Grant, 60
Me. 88.
There are numerous exceptions to the
general rule-that a day is indivisible"and whenever it becomes necessary to
determine who of several persons have
priority of right, time may be distinguished with accuracy :" Tufts v. Carradine, 3 La. Ann. 430. Thus where
one writ of attachment was lodged in
the sheriff's office one minute before
another writ, the former was held to
have precedence. "Time is in its nature divisible from years down to days,
hours and minutes'; a minute, therefore, will give a priority as essentially
in point of time as a year or a day :"
Callahan v. Hallowell, 2 Bay (S.- C.)
8; Brainard v. Bushnell, 11 Conn. 16.
Where it is necessary to show which of
two events took place first, the court
may enter into the question of the fractions of a day, and it will regard the
particular hour of the day at which the
defendant dies, so as to see whether
execution issued previously to his demise : Clinch v. Smith, 8 D. P. C. 337.
This brings up zo mind the case cited
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by Blackstone, where father and son had priority over the other: Michaels v.
were hung at the same time. There Boyd, I Ind. 259.
In some cases a judgment has been
evidence was introduced to show that
the son struggled last, thus showing deemed to have taken effect from the
that he outlived his father and inherited earliest moment of the day: Edwards
the property, so that the daughters of the v. Reginam, 9 Exch. 628 ; Wright v.
son could exclude the second son of the Mills, 41H. &N. 488; Green v. Laurie,
1
father (their uncle) in the inheritance 1 Exch. 335.
A different rule is declared in Biggam
of their grandfather7s estate.
In Roe d. Wrangham v. Hersey, 3 v. Merritt, Walker (Miss.) 430; a. o.
Wils. 274, the court characterized, as a 12 Am. Dec. 576, where it is said the
mere fiction of law, the general propo- court will ascertain which was entered
sition that there were no fractions of a first and award its preference: Johnson
day; that " by fiction of law, the whole v. Smith, 2 Burr. 950 ; Lemon v. taats,
time of the assizes and the whole session I Cow. 592; Small v. McChesney, 3 Id.
of parliament may be, and sometimes 19 ; Rogers v. Beach, 18 Wend. 533;
ate, considered as one day; yet the Bates v. Hinsdale, 65 N. C. 423; Sma1r
matter of fact shall overturn the fic- Appeal, 24 Penn. St. 338 (Mortgage
tion in order 'to do justice between the and Judgment); Murfree v. Carmak,
4 Yerg. 270; Berry -. Clements, 9
parties."
.1
Humph. 312.
In Combd Y. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1423, 1434,
So where there is a conflict between
Lord MANwuELD said: "But though
the law does not, in general, allow of bankruptcy and attachment proceedings,
the fraction of a day, yet it admits it in the very hours may be"shown: 2omas
cases where it is necessary to distinguish. v. Desanges, 2 B. & A. 586 ; Saddler v.
Leigh, 4 Camp. 197; Stead r. GasAnd I do not see why the very hour of
the day may not be so too, when it is coigne, 8 Taunt. 527 ; Westbrook Manuf.
necessary and can be done; for it is not Co. v. Grant, 60 Me. 88; Godson -.
anctuary,4 B. & A. 255; In re Wellike a mathematical point which cannot
man, 7 Law Reporter 25; Ladley v.
be divided."
Creigton, 70 Penn. St. 490.
1i Pugh Y. Rohinson, I T. R. 116,
So the same rule is held with respect
BULLU, 3., said, there being no fraction of a day in judicial proceedings to creditor's bills: Sqord v. Douglas,
where there are two judgments, beth 4 Edw. Ch. 537; itch v. Smith, 10
referring to the same day, the priority Paige 1.
Or where two courts each appoint a
of one cannot be averred: Rockldll v.
Hanner, 4 McL. 554; a. c. 15 How. receiver: People v. Central City Bank,
189 ; Burney v. Boyget, I How. Pr. 39 ; 53 Barb. 412.
But, as a general rule, courts will not
Mechanics' Bank v. Gorman, 8 W. & S.
inquire into fractions of a day except to
304; Adams v. Dyer, 8 Johns. 347;
Metzler v. Kilgore, 23 Am. Dec. 76 prevent injustice: Clute v., Clute, 3
(Mortgage and Judgment); Hendrick- Denlo 263; a. c. 4 Id. 241; Blydenson's Appeal, 24 Penn. St. 363 ;C7aason's burgh v. Cotheal, 4 Comst. 418 ; a. o. 5
How. Pr. 200; Jones v. Porter, 6 Id.
Appeal, 22 Id. 359.
And where two judgments of different 286 ; Rogers v. Beach, 18 Wend. 533 ;
date were rendered against a defendant, Havens v. Dibble, Id. 655; Brainardv.
and he afterwards acquired real estate Hanford, 6 Hill 368; Lester v. Garupon which these judgments became a land, 15 Ves. 246; Bigelow v. Wilisonj
1 Pick. 485; Portland Bank v. Maine
lien at one and the same time, neither
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Bank, 11 Mass. 204; Johnson v. Pennington, 3 Green (N. J.) 188; 3 Opinions Attorney-Genqral 82; .Kimm v.
Osgood, 19 Mo. 60.
A pauper entered upon the occupation of premises at twelve o'clock on
September 30th 1850, and on the same
evening signed a memorandum which
stated that the tenancy was for one
year, commencing on the 30th instant.
He continued in possession until September 29th 1851, about four o'clock in
the afternoon of which day he gave up
possession to an incoming tenant: Held,
that the fractions of the day on which the
pauper entered were not to be regarded,
and therefore he had occupied the premises for "one whole year at the least :"
Beg. v. St. Mary, Warwick, 1 El. & B1.
816; s. c. 17 Jur. 551 ; 22 L. J., M.
C. 109. Where the right of the crown
and a creditor comes into conflict, fractions of a day cannot be taken into
account, but the former must prevail:
Edwards v. Beg., 9 Exch. 628; 18 Jur.
384.
We are not unmindful that there are
cases which hold that there are no
fractions of a day. Thus, In Matter of
H wes, it appeared that the bankrupt
act was repealed March 3d 1843..
Hower presented his petition on that
day, and it was held that he was too
late ; that on questions of that nature
there can be no division of a day: 21 Vt.
619 ; s. a. 6 Law Reporter 297. And
a like decision had been previously
made: Matter of Wdman, 20 Vt. 657;
s. c. 7 Law Reporter 25.
For a case deciding which of two
inconsistent statutes passed on the same
day should prevail, see Metropolitan
Board of Health v. Schmlades, 10 Abb.
Pr. (N. S.) 205.
For an instance where a day was
divided by contract in computing time,
see Grosvenor v. Magill, 37 Ill. 239.
* CONSTITUTONAL

AxmEmD1"NTs.

-

In the case of Louisville v. Savings

Bank, supra, the question was decided
as to the time an amendment to the
constitution takes effect. It is there
decided that the amendment voted for
July 2d 1870, to the Constitution of
Illinois, took effect when the polls
closed on that day at six o'clock in the
evening.
In this the Supreme Court followed
the Illinois case of chall v. Bowman,
62 Ill. 321, and subsequent cases:
.Richards v. Donagho, 66 Ill. 73;
Wright v. Bishop, 88 Id. 302. See
other cases in the Supreme Court of the
United States: Wade v. Walnut, 105
U. S. 1 ; where it was assumed that
the amendment to the Constitution,
voted for July 2d 1870,-took effect on
that day: Town of Concord v. Portsnwuth Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 625;
County of Moultrie v. Rockingham Ten
Cent Savings Bank, Id. 631 ; County of
Randolph v. Post, 93 Id. 502 ; Fairfield
v. County of Gallatin, 100 Id. 47;
Walnut v. Wade, 103 Id. 683.
Congress, under the Reconstruction
Act, approved the Constitution of Virginia on April 10th 1869, and ordered
it to be submitted to the people. On
July 6th 1869, it was submitted and
adopted by a large majority of the people, who, on the same day, elected a
governor, legislature and other state
officers. The governor was inaugurated
in September 1869, and the legislature
met in October 1869, and passed acts
ratifying the 14th and 15th Amendments
to the Constitution of the United Statesall of these preliminaries being required
by the Reconstruction Acts before the
admission of the state to representation
in Congress.
Congress, on January
26th 1870, passed an act admitting the
state to such representation. The Constitution contained a provision for homestead and exemption, but this was not
applicable to debts incurred prior to the
time the Constitution went into effect:
Held, that as to the clause relating to
exemption, the Constitution went into
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effect on the day of its ratification by the
people, July 6th 1869.
Opinion by
WAiTn, C. J. : In re Deckert, 13 Am.
L. Reg. 624.
Where the governor, speaker of the
senate and president of the convention,
or any two of them, were to compare
the votes, and if it appeared that a majority of the votes cast were for the new
constitution, then any. two of them
should append a certificate of the result
of the votes, from which time the constitution was established, and the governor made proclamation of the result,
it was said the proclamation of the governor merely attested the date at which
such constitution went into effect: Bitbrey v. APoton,'4 Bax. (Tenn.) 232.
In 1869 the people of Texas adopted
a new constitution in pursuance of the
Reconstruction Act of Congress of
March 2d 1867, and acts supplemental
thereto, and at the same time voted for
members of the legislature, governor
and other state officers.
Before the
state could be represented in Congress
it was necessary that that body should
approve of such constitution, which it
did in 1870. It was said that "this
condition of the reconstruction laws did
not prevent the constitution from becoming the organic law of the state, on
its raificatida by the people, for allthe
purposes of state government:" Campbell Y. -eids, 35 Tex. 752.
In Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 276, it
is said: "The result of the election
showing the adopti6n of this article by a
majority of the votes cast, must, within
the meaning of the rule [that every law
takes effect upon its passag], be deemed
its passage. The canvass of the votes
cast, by the various beards of canvassers
as required by law, is as much a part of
the election as the casting of the votes by
the electors. The election is not deemed
complete until the result is declared by
the state hoard of canvassers as required
by law. When the result was declared
by the state board of canvassers, the

article was adopted, and, under the rule,
became operative at once, unless, from
the nature of the provisions themselves,
or those of some other law, it appears
that it was to take effect at some future
period, or unless it clearly appear that
the intention of the framers of the article, and of those by whom it wa
adopted, was, that it should not take
effect until some definite future time."
This was upon the adoption of a new
constitution, which declared: "Sect. 5.
This constitution shall be in force from
and including the first day of January
next after its adoption by the people.".' The election was held in November, and the result canvassed and
declared in December. This case his
been cited with approval In Peopld v.
Gardner, 59 Barb. 198; a. o. 45 N. Y.
812.
Many of the state constitutions have
express provision what shall be done
before an amendment *to it shall take
effect; while other constitutions give
the legislature power to provide rules
and regulations, even to declaring what
acts shall be done previous to the tim
the amendment goes into force. Some
(possibly the greater number) state constitutions contain a clause similar to the
constitution of Indiana, viz.: "If a
majority of said electors shall ratify the
same, such amendment or amendments
shall become a part of their constitution:" Art. xvi. sect. 1. It is clear
that a constitution cannot be amended
in any other way than that which has
been provided by it If no provision
for its amendment has been made, then
the legislature has the power to prescribe
the manner in which it may be done,
when the amendments shall take effect,
and submit them to the people. If the
people ratify them according to the provisions of the legislative act, then they
become part of the organic law in the
manner and at the time provided in such
act. But if the constitution has provided the way for amendment, that way

HALL v. BUTTERFIELD.
The
and.no other must be followed.
legislature can attach no condiqon to
the submission: State v. Swjift, 69 Ind.
518; Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100.
Neither can it say when the amendment shall go into effect, for the voice
of the people expressed in a legitimate
Way overrides the provisions of the act
of the legislature.
The Constitution of the United States,
upon the subject of amendments, is not
unlike that of Indiana; yet the 13th,
14th and 15th Amendments to that
instrument are generally supposed and
spoken of as having taken effect on the

day they were declared by the secretary
of state to have been ratified by the
requisite number of states, although the
last state ratifying them had performed
that act sokae time before. Slaughter
House Cases, 16 Wall. 91, dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Fmiz: "On
the 18th of December 1865, this amendment was ratified, that is, the official
proclamation of its ratification was then
made."
Dissenting opinion of M1r.
Justice FELD in Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 363,
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of New Hampsire.
HALL v. BUTTERFIELD.
An infant-who purchases goods on credit, and does not return them, is liable for
so much of the price as is equal to the benefit derived by him from the purchase.
The question of the amount of benefit received by the infant is one of mixed law
and fact, to be found by the tribunal trying the facts.

The
ASSUmPSIT to recover for goods sold and delivered.
defendant pleaded infancy, and the question was reserved whether
that was a bar to the plaintiffs' recovery. The defendant was
engaged in trade, and the goods were purchased by him for the
purposes of trade, and were not necessaries within the ordinary
meaning of that term.

Albi

Streeter and Band, for the plaintiffs.

Afugridge, for the defendant, contended that the contract was
voidab)le at the election of the defendant, and that nothing was
necessary to be done by him as a prerequisite to avoidance, citing
and commenting on .Heath v. West, 28 N. H. 101 ; Pitts v. Hall,
9 Id. 446 ; Badger v. Pinney, 15 Mass. 362; Carr v. Olough,
26 N. H. 294.

HAT

v. BUTTERFIEM.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STANLEY, J.-The defendant interposes the plea of infancy as a

bar to the plaintiff's. right to recover, and, so far as this right
depends on an express contract, it is a complete answer. The
express contract, on which the plaintiffs rely, was voidable at the
defeniant's election, but it does not necessarily follow, because
the defendant exercises his privilege to avoid the contract, that he
is under no liability to the plaintiffs.
The right of infants, lunatics, persons non compos mentis, and drunkards, when in such a state as to be entirely deprived of reason,
to avoid their contracts, is placed on the same ground. They are
considered to be devoid of that freedom of will, combined with
maturity of reason and judgment, essential to enable them to give
the assent necessary to make a valid contract. To protect them
from fraud and imposition, to which from their want of understanding and immaturity of judgment they are exposed, they are
permitted to allege their want of capacity to bind themselves by
contract. But this privilege is to be used as a shield, not as a
sword; not to do injustice, but to prevent it: Zoucl v. Parsons,
3 Burr. 1794; Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304 ; Allis v. Billings,
6 Met. 415; Hallett v. Oakes, I Cush. 296; Taft v. Pike, 14
Vt. 405; Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32 Id. 652; Matter of Barker,
2 Johns. 'Ch. 233; Sanford v. Sanford, 62 N. Y. 553, 557;
Squier v. ffydliff, 9 Mich. 274 ;' Spicer v. Earl, 41 Id. 191;
Allen v. Berryhill,27 Iowa 540; Benj. Sales, s. 21; 1 Pars. Cont.
293; Chit. Con. 135, 136, 141 ; 1 Fonbl., B. 1, "c.2, s. 4; Bing.
Inf. 73; Ewell L. C. 588.
But while the disabilities of these different classes of persons,
and the reasons on which they are placed are the same, and they
equally require protection, the application of the principles of law
governing their rights and liabilities and their status has been
widely different, and has undergone marked changes from time to
time. Under the ancient common law, lunatics were allowed to
show their lunacy in defence of their alleged contracts (2' Bl. Com.
291); but later, in the times of Edward I1., "a scruple began to
arise whether a man should be permitted to blemish himself by
pleading his own insanity. Under Henry VI. this way of reason-'
ing * * * was seriously adopted by the judges, * * * and from

these loose authorities, which Fitzherbert does not scruple to reject
as being contrary to .reason, the maxim that a man shall not

HALL v. BUTTERFIELD.

263

stultify himself hath been handed. down as settled law':" 2 Bl.
Com. 291, 292; Bac. Abr., Idiots and Lunatics, F. The. reason
assigned for this maxim was, that a man cannot know in his sanity
what he did when he was insane (Stroud v. Marshall, Cro. Eliz.
398; Cross v. Andrews, Id. 622); or, as stated by Littleton,
"no man of full age shall be received in any plea by the law to
disable his own person :" Co. Litt., B. 3, 247 b. That such a
doctrine ever could have been held to be law seems incredible, for,
to use the language of WILMOT, J., it does seem to be very unaccountable that a man should be at liberty to avoid his own acts
caused by the duress of man, and not those caused by the duress
of Heaven : Wilm. Op. 155; 5 Bac. Abr. (Bouv. ed.) 26. "How
so absurd and mischievous a maxim could have found its way
into any system of jurisprudence, professing to act upon civilized
beings, is a matter of wonder and humiliation. There have been
many struggles against it by eminent lawyers in all ages of the
common law; but it is, perhaps, somewhat difficult to resist the
authorities which assert its establishment in the fundamentals of
the common law-a circumstance which may well abate the boast,
so often and so rashly made, that the common law is the perfection
.of human reason :" Story Eq., s. 225.' But this doctrine has
been exploded as manifestly against natural justice (2 Kent Com.
451), and it has been finally considered, in this and other jurisdictions, that lunatics and persons non compos mentis may show
their incapacity as a defence to their contracts. Indeed, this
doctrine seems now well established in this country: Lang v.
Whidden, 2 N. H. 435; Burke v. Allen, 29 Id. 106; Mitchell
v. .Kingman, 5 Pick. 431; Rice v. Peet, 15 Johns. 503; 5 Bac.
Abr. (Bouv. ed.) 26; 2 Kent's Com. 451, 452, and notes and
authorities, passim.
Again : it was formerly held that the contracts of lunatics and
persons non compos mentis were absolutely void (Thompson v.
Leach, 3 Mod. 301; Gore v. Gibson, 13 Mee. & W. 623; Chit.
Con. 24,' 139); but this has been seriously questioned, and it is
now held that they are voidable only( Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick. 217;
Allis v. Billings, 6 Met. 415; S. a. 2 Cush. 19; Ingrahamv. Baldwin, 9 N. Y. 45; Met. Con. 80; Pars. N. & B. 151; 2 Hill R. P.
408, s. 16); and that where a contract is entered into in good faith
with a lunatic or a person non contos nmentis, and is for the benefit"
of such person, courts of law, as well as equity, will uphold it: Me-
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Cn'llis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569; Young v. Stevens, 48 Id. 138;
Mit. Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541; Hallett v. Oakes, 1
Cush. 296; Holton v. Camrouz, 2 Welsby, H. & G. 487; s. c. 4
Id. 17; Elliot v. Ince, 7 De G., M. & G. 475; Baxter v. -Earlof
Portsmouth, 5 B. & C. 170; Niell v. Morleq, 9 Yes. Jr. 478;
Brown v. Jodrell, 8 C. & P. 80; Gore v. Gibson, supra; I
Pars. Con. 886 ; Benj. Sales, a. 29 ; Story Eq., s. 228. Greenleaf states the doctrine thus: Where goods have been supplied
to a party wh.ich were necessaries, or were suitable to his or her
station or employment in life, and which were furnished under.
circumstances evincing that no advantage of his or her mental
infirmity was attempted to be taken, and which have been enjoyedby such party, then he or she is liable at law, as well as in equity,
for the value of the goods: 2 Gr. Ev., s. 869; Kendall v. May,
10 Allen 62.
From this brief review, it is seen that there has been a hange
in the law relating to the rights and liabilities of lunatics and persons non compos maentis, from absolute liability upon all cofitracts
to no liability upon any contract, and from that to a liability limited by the benefit received. This. latter doctrine places their
rights and liabilities upon broader., more rational and just grounds
than they have ever been before, for it regards the rights of both
parties-treats both parties to the contract as equally under the
protection of the law, the lunatic and the person non compos mentis,
by allowing them to rescind their contracts, accounting for the
benefit received from it; the other party, by allowing him to
recover to the extent of the benefit received by the lunatic.
The privilege accorded to infants to avoid their contracts restson the same ground as that accorded to lunatics and persons non
compos mentis-protection against fraud to which, by reason of
their immaturity of judgment, they are liable. So far as relates
to their contracts, these different classes of persons are said to be
parallel, both in law and reason: Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 804;
Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. 286; Thompson
v. Leach, 3 Mod. 801; 1 Pars. Con. 298; Story Eq., sects. 223, 224,
242, and authorities passim. But the principles applicable to their
contracts have not been the same, and even'with, regard to the

contracts of infants the law has been materially changed. Until
the decision in Zouch v. Parsons, 8 Burr. 1794, none of the contracts of minors were enforceable. They were all either void or
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voidable: Bac. Abr., Infant I, 3; Com. Dig., Enfant B, 5; Lloyd
v. Gregory, Cro. Dar 502. But in Zouch v. Parsons, supra, it
was held that infants were liable on their contracts for necessaries
on the ground of necessity, and because they were of benefit to the
infant. - Lord MANSFIELD said, page 1801, "Great inconveniences
must arise to others if infants were bound by no act. The law,
therefore, at the same time that it protects their imbecility and
indiscretion from injury through their own iinprudence, enables
them to do binding acts for their benefit. * * * A third rule,
deducible from the nature of the privilege that is given as a
shield and not as a sword, is, that it never shall be turned into an
offensive weapon of fraud or injustice. * * * The end of the
privilege is to protect infants. To that object, therefore, all the
rules and their exceptions must be directed." In Druryv. Drury,
cited in Maddon v. White, 2 T. R. 159, Lord MANSFIELD laid it
down as a general principle, that if an agreement be for the benefit of an infant at the time, it shall bind him; and BULLER, J., said
Lord HARDWIOKE, afterwards adopted this rule. But this broad
principle, announced by Lord MANSFIELD, and which seems so just
and wise, and which secures to infants all the protection necessary
to save them from the consequences of immaturity of judgment
and understanding, has been limited so that under it they have
only been held liable, upon an implied contract, for necessaries,
such as necessary meat, drink, apparel, medicine and instruction,
and, if married, provision for wife and children: Bing. Inf. 87.
Recently the term has been extended to include counsel fees, in
cases involving their liberty; Barker v. Hfibbard, 54 N. H. 539;
MACrillis v. Bartlett, 8 Id. 569. Formerly it was held by some
authorities that they could not be allowed to rescind their contracts in regard to either personal or real property until after
coming of age; but this has been modified, so that, as to their contracts in regard to personal property, they may rescind as well before
as after: Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H. 289, 291; Roof v. Stafford, 7
Cow. 179 ; Stafford v. Roof, 9 Id. 626 ; Zouch v. Parsons,supra.
So they were formerly allowed to rescind, and recover what they'
had paid on their contracts without restoring what they had received. But this has been changed, and it is now held that they
cannot rescind without restoring or offering to restore the consideration, if remaining in specie, and in the possession or control of the
infant and capable of return; and in some jurisdictions it is now
VOL.
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held, that where the consideration cannot be restored, the infant,
before -he can be allowed to rescind, must place the adult in as good
condition as though he had returned the consideration, or he must
account for the value of it ; Carrv. Olough, smpra ; Heath v. West,
28 N. H. 101, 110; Locke v. Smith, 41 Id. 346, 353 ; Young v.
Sterons, 48 Ia. 133; 137 ; Heath v. Steien8, 48 Id. 251; Kimbali
v. Bruce, 58 Id. 327; -Pricev. Furman, 27 Vt. 26.8 ; Badtervr
Phinney, 15 Mass. 359; Bily v. Mfallory, 33 Conn. 201, 297 Ewell L. 0. 123, 125 ; 2 Kent Com. -286, 240 ; Benj. Sales, s, 27,
note. This is especially the case in contracts for services, where
the infant seeks to avoid his contract and recover what his services
are reasonably worth; and this allowq the adult to set off against
the value of the plaintiff's services the reasonable value of what the
infant has received on account of such services; or, in other words,
thbe infant is entitled to recover for the benefit which the adult has,
derived from the services performed by him: Luf in v. Mayall,
25 N. H. 82 ; Locke v. Smith, 8upra; .MCrillis v. How, 3. N.
H. 348;' Vent v. Osgood, 19 Pick. 572; Stone v. Dennii-n, 13
Id. 1,; Breed v. tTudd, 1 Gray 455; aaffney v, Hayden, 110
Mass. 137; Hozie v. Lincoln, 25 Vt. '206; Harney v. Owen, 4
Blackf. 837 ; Squier v. Hydlif, 9.Mich. 274 ; Spicer v. Earl,41
Id. 191; Whitmareh v. Hall,8 Den. 875;. Makarell v. Bacbelor,
Cro. Eliz. 583; lye v. Che8ter, Cro. Jac. 560; Ewell L. C. 109.
Again: as has been shown, infants were formerly held liable on
their contracts for necessaries; but it is now held that they are
liable, tiot by virtue of any contract, tut on the ground of an
implied legal liability based on the necessity of the situation: Bing.
Inf., Bennett's Notes 87.
It is apparent that the tendency of the later decisions is to enlarge
the liabilities and obligations of infants; and, while the liability
has not in their case been exteided so far as it has in regard .to
lunatics and persons %on compo# mef,
-tprinciple
o "which it
rests is the same. The grants of inifaits and persons on, compo#
are parallel, both in law and reason :- Thompson v. Leach, 8 Mod.
301; Seaver v. Phelp8, 11 Pick' 801; Breckenndge!8 Heir K.v,
Ormsby, sumpra. In view of these facts, no reason appears why the
wise and just principle enunciated by Lord M.AsFIFn should not
be given its full force, aind the rights and obligations of lunatics,
persons non compos enentia, drunkards, when in such a state as to
be entirely bereft of reason, and infants be placed on the same
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ground. The obligation to account only for the benefit actually
received secures ample protection from fraud and imposition, and
at the same time prevents the privilege from being used to perpetrate fraud. It prevents their disability from being "not their
protection merely, but an extraordinary legal ability to rob others;
not a shield, but a sword; not a mere legal incapacity to be plundered by their fellow-men, but a vast capacity to plunder them with
impunity."
The right to recover for necessaries is given, because the infant
has derived a benefit therefrom. It is upon no other ground. If
the benefit is the foundation of the right why should it be limited
to necessaries ? It cannot be said that the infant, if engaged in
trade or business, may not derive a benefit therefrom. If benefit
obtained by the infant is the test in one case, why not make it the
test in all cases ? This has been made the test in the case of lunatics and persons non compos mentis, and it should be applied in
the case of infants. The true rule is, that the contract of an infant
or lunatic, whether executed or executory, cannot be rescinded
or avoided without restoring to the other party the consideration
received, or allowing him to recover compensation for all the benefit
conferred upon the party seeking to avoid the contract. The
question whether the infant has received a benefit-like the question of what are necessaries, and what sum the infant ought to pay
for them, or the question of negligence or ordinary care, and other
similar questions-is one of mixed law and fact. No uniform rule
can be established. A contract, which under some circumstances
to one person might be beneficial, under others and to another
might be injurious. In no two cases are we likely to find the same
facts; and it must always be for the trier to apply the law to the
facts, and determine whether the infant has been benefited, and to
what extent: Bing. Inf., Bennett's notes 88.
Our conclusion is, that the plea of infancy is not a bar to the
plaintiffs' recovery, but that they may recover to the extent of
the benefit received by the defendant, not exceeding the price he
agreed to pay for the goods.
Case discharged.
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